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Abstract 
This reports describes the analysis and findings of our study exploring what 
drives successful organizational adaptation in the context of technology transition 
and acquisition within the Department of Defense (DoD). We began this study 
seeking to understand what influences the successful transition of commercial off-
the-shelf technologies to the warfighter, focusing on the Joint Capabilities 
Technology Demonstration (JCTD) office as a successful case study. In the course 
of our investigation, we noted shifts in organization structure, goals and business 
processes of the JCTD in response to changing needs of warfighters in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Further exploration indicated that these shift were not unique to the 
JCTD, but were one example of many adaptive solutions to changing needs faced 
by the DoD acquisition community. This led us to focus our research on better 
understanding what drives successful organizational adaptation. Our analysis 
suggests that ad hoc problem solving may be an undervalued, yet broadly practiced 
skill set within the DoD, which may support adaptive responses to change by the 
acquisition community. 
Keywords: JCTD, ad hoc problem solving, organizational adaptions, DoD 
acquistion  
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Defense Acquisition and the Case of the 
Joint Capabilities Technology 
Demonstration Office: Ad Hoc Problem 
Solving as a Mechanism for Adaptive 
Change 
Introduction 
Defense acquisition is a key technical and business function, vital to the 
success of the U.S. military. However, it is also the focus of seemingly constant 
critique and reform. Most recently, the rapidly changing global environment and 
tactics of adversaries have highlighted gaps in the organization’s business process 
capability, intensifying the calls for process reform. It is widely recognized that DoD 
acquisition must become more nimble and flexible to more rapidly deploy materiel 
solutions to new and emerging problems and that doing so will require changes in 
organization structure, culture, and processes. What is less clear is how to gain the 
most value from investment in change efforts, which can have substantial direct and 
indirect cost implications. This question is the focus of this report of the preliminary 
conclusions based on an ongoing qualitative study.  
We began this study seeking to understand what influences the successful 
transition of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies to the warfighter, focusing 
on the Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration (JCTD) office as a successful 
case study. In the course of our investigation, we noted shifts in organization 
structure, goals, and business processes of the JCTD office resulting from 
responses to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Further exploration indicated that 
these shifts were not unique to the JCTD office, but that the shifts we observed were 
one example of many adaptive solutions to changing needs faced by the DoD 
acquisition community. In order to better understand technology transition in the 
current context and in accordance with a grounded research approach, we adapted 
our analysis plan to focus on what drives successful adaptation (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008; Howard-Grenville, Golden-Biddle, Irwin, & Mao, 2011; Lofland, Snow, 
Anderson, & Lofland, 2006). This report is based on our initial collection and analysis 
of archival and interview data. We are continuing to collect data through interviews 
and document searches, following a process of theoretical sampling (Clarke, 2005; 
Locke, 2001) selecting subjects and documents to elaborate on the concepts 
reported here.  
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Since 2001 and 2003 respectively, U.S. engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq 
have highlighted gaps in certain capabilities: U.S. warfighters were not always 
equipped for the unique challenges they faced under unanticipated scenarios. This 
was evidenced by casualties incurred and the submission of more than 7,000 urgent 
need statements (Gansler, 2009). As these conflicts ensued, more than 20 
organizations and a variety of business process changes emerged to meet 
warfighter needs. This situation, and the responses to it, are the focus of the widely 
cited “Gansler report” (2009), which forms a context for this study. The Gansler 
report stated, “The essence of the problem is the need to field militarily useful 
solutions faster…The reality is that the Department is not geared to acquire and field 
capabilities in a rapidly shifting threat environment” (p. viii). The Gansler report 
concluded that the ad hoc organizations and effective processes that emerged to 
meet the unanticipated needs of U.S forces in Iraq and Afghanistan should be 
consolidated, codified, and institutionalized. This conclusion is frequently interpreted 
as criticism of the extant acquisition process and used to justify further expansion of 
ad hoc solutions (see, for example, Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2011). 
In accord with what is formally termed an entrepreneurial mindset (Haynie, 
Shepherd, Mosakowski, & Earley, 2010), we reframe this interpretation and seek to 
contribute to positive changes in U.S. defense acquisition through an analysis based 
upon it. Specifically, we explore the implications to DoD acquisition from “standing 
up more than 20 ad hoc offices, agencies, task forces, funds, and other 
organizations to respond and fulfill these diverse needs” (Gansler, 2009, p.3) and 
the problem-solving these entities engaged in to emerge as an exemplary case of 
organizational adaptation to unexpected changes. When conducting qualitative case 
studies, researchers should “go for extreme situations, critical incidents and social 
dramas … where the progress is transparently observable” (Pettigrew, 1990, 275). 
Given the tremendous size and bureaucratic nature of the DoD, the vital role of 
acquisition on the organization’s outcomes, and the sudden and unpredictable 
external change presented by the September 2001 attacks and subsequent U.S. 
engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, we view the acquisition community’s 
response as such an extreme case, justifying focused qualitative exploration.  
Furthermore, we argue that reframing the Gansler report, to view the 
response as an exemplary, positive case, highlights a heretofore under appreciated 
skill set, at which the DoD may excel. Based on our reframing and research on 
organizational routines, dynamic capabilities, learning, and change, we examine the 
cost and benefits of investments in this skill set and other business capabilities. 
Management scholars use the term capability to refer to a high-level, patterned, and 
repetitious routine that confers a set of decision options for producing outputs 
(Winter, 2003, p. 991). In this report, we use the term organizational capability to 
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distinguish this concept from the concept of a military capability, perhaps more 
familiar to our audience. 
This report proceeds as follows. First, we ground the study by describing the 
organizational context of DoD acquisition and the events that resulted in recognition 
of the need for rapid fielding. Next, we analyze and reframe the 2009 Gansler report. 
Then, we describe the case of the JCTD and our methods for analyzing it. We 
explore the potential costs and benefit implications of different approaches to 
securing adaptive business responses. We conclude by summarizing our preliminary 
analysis and describing the next steps in our ongoing study. 
Defense Acquisition and the Shock of September 2001 
Acquisition is big business. Each year, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
spends over $100 billion for research, development, procurement, and support of 
weapon systems. Acquisition is also a rule-intensive business. In addition to myriad 
laws governing federal acquisition in the U.S., a plethora of regulations specify how 
to accomplish the planning, review, execution. and oversight of defense acquisition 
programs, large and small, sole-source and competitive, military and commercial. 
Due in some part to the large size and many rules associated with defense 
acquisition, the organizations responsible for these activities tend to be large and 
rule-intensive themselves, reflecting the kinds of centralized, formalized, specialized, 
and oversight-intensive forms corresponding to the classic machine bureaucracy 
from organization theory. The problem is that this classic organizational structure is 
well known to be exceptionally poor at responding to change. In the context of 
military transformation, such a problem should be clear and compelling. But which 
superior organizational approaches are available to acquisition leaders and policy-
makers? What evidence supports claims of superiority for one organizational 
approach versus another? Questions such as these are difficult to answer through 
most research methods employed to study organizations (e.g., case studies and 
surveys). 
Defense acquisition has been characterized by frequent and extensive 
critique and reform over the past 50 years, leading at least one author to argue that 
the only constant in the military’s acquisition system is the continuous reform 
(Rasche, 2011). However, driven by the changing demands of warfighters, the 
commercial rate of technological development, and defense budget constraints, the 
nature and speed of change in the acquisition system has intensified over the past 
decade. We briefly summarize key reformational events of the past two decades 
below. 
In 1993, then-Vice President Al Gore’s Creating a Government that Works 
Better and Costs Less: The Gore Report on Reinventing Government sought to 
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reduce government waste and inefficiency, calling upon the DoD acquisition 
community to simplify procurement, eliminate regulatory burden, and rely to a 
greater degree on the commercial marketplace. The Clinton administration was 
focused on reinventing government by improving government processes, including 
procurement. Secretary of Defense Leslie Aspin voiced his concerns that acquisition 
program costs and schedule problems would threaten the ability of the military 
services to continue to acquire the newest technologies such as had performed so 
well during the Persian Gulf War. Aspin proposed a resource strategy to allow the 
DoD to afford the best technology in a times of austerity (Fox, 2011). 
Shortly thereafter, Secretary of Defense, William Perry released the memo A 
Mandate for Change, (1994) which called for a cultural change within the DoD, 
shifting the DoD’s focus from the acquisition process to its outcome in the field, and 
asserting that the major obstacles to positive change were internal. Acquisition 
reform continued under the leadership of Secretary of Defense William Cohen who 
in a 1997 report, expressed the importance of continuing to reform the way the DoD 
did business such that the department would be as agile, lean and focused as our 
warfighters (Cohen, 1997). Cohens’s report asserted that overhead and support 
activities must be reduced and reallocated to warfighters, in light of new threats and 
constrained budgets (Cohen, 1997). In 2000, The Road Ahead: Accelerating the 
Transformation of the Department of Defense Acquisition and Logistics Processes 
and Practices detailed the “Revolution in Business Affairs” (RBA), which called for 
best practices from the private sector be implemented in a “Revolution in Military 
Affairs” (RMA). The report argued that “the Department continues to rely on 
acquisition processes, organizations and infrastructure largely developed in the 
years following World War II [and]…continues to face a limited investment budget, 
constrained by a relatively stable top-line budget, and squeezed by increased 
operations and support costs from aging weapons systems” (Gansler, 2000, p. 2). 
On September 10, 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave a 
speech in which he expressed his determination to save the Pentagon from itself. 
The secretary claimed that the Pentagon bureaucracy was the serious threat to 
national security, but he clarified, saying, “Not the people, the processes. Not the 
civilians, but the systems. Not the men and women in uniform, but the uniformity of 
thought and action that we too often impose on them” (Rumsfeld, 2001, p. 1). 
Rumsfeld’s vision for reform included commercial outsourcing of functions not 
directly related to warfighting to save money, streamlining the system development 
process to match the private sector’s, and retaining a quality workforce within the 
military forces and acquisition community. Immediately after Rumsfeld’s call, the 
events of September 11 occurred, along with the subsequent wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. These soon highlighted gaps in the DoD’s ability to rapidly deploy 
solutions to its warfighters facing their new scenarios and problems. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó - 5 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the rapid adaptation of enemy capabilities 
highlighted the need for rapid response by the acquisition community. The use of 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq is a frequently cited example of enemy 
forces exploiting “capability gaps in the technology, systems, and equipment used by 
U.S. forces” (GAO, 2011, p. 4). Combatant commands submitted more than 7,000 
statements for urgent solutions, resulting in the eventual creation of “over 20 ad hoc 
offices, agencies, task forces, funds and other organizations to meet warfighter 
needs” (Gansler, 2009 p. vii).  
The Gansler Report 
In 2009, the Defense Science Board’s Task Force on the Fulfillment of Urgent 
Operational Needs published a report, known widely as the Gansler report, which 
analyzed the DoD’s rapid acquisition process. The core finding of the report was that 
major institutional changes need to be made to the existing DoD acquisition process. 
The report asserted that rapid is counter to the current acquisition workforce culture 
and that the current ad hoc system is not sustainable and will not create a 
permanent solution. Furthermore, the report cited institutional barriers (people, 
funding, and processes) as powerful inhibitors to successful rapid acquisition within 
the DoD. Thus, the report argues that not all DoD needs can be met by the same 
acquisition process and the DoD must create and codify a separate “rapid” process. 
According to the Gansler report, although field commanders were resourceful 
in acquiring local solutions, the enemy’s new tactics exploited the DoD’s inability to 
rapidly field new capabilities (Gansler, 2009). The Gansler report did recognize the 
efforts of the acquisition community, stating for example, “It is hard to criticize the 
industrious nature of those in the Department who have made something happen 
when urgent needs have been presented” (Gansler, 2009, p. 9). However, its overall 
perspective and its interpretation in subsequent citations is a largely critical call for 
reform: “These approaches do not offer a long-term solution” (p. 9). In particular, the 
report highlighted the ad hoc, work-around nature of the solutions, noting that 
“numerous rapid reaction programs and organizations have been established in 
recent years to respond to combatant commander needs—processes that work 
within and around the traditional system to get solutions into the field” (p. 6) and 
cited a lack of institutional changes to organize, formalize, and codify the ad hoc 
approaches as evidence of continued failure.  
By and large, the Gansler report represents the breadth of criticisms of the 
DoD rapid acquisition process and its ad hoc entities, since their emergence shortly 
after the invasion of Iraq. More recent assessments offered similar criticisms. The 
Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) report to congressional committees in 
2011, Warfighter Support: DoD’s Urgent Needs Processes Need a More 
Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation, identified at 
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least 31 separate entities that manage urgent acquisition needs. The report claimed 
that the numerous points through which a warfighter may submit a request for an 
urgent need is an example of redundancy and interagency overlap. The GAO 
asserted that the DoD does not have a comprehensive policy for how urgent needs 
are to be addressed, lacks visibility over the full range of its urgent needs efforts, has 
no senior-level focal point to lead the department’s efforts to fulfill urgent needs, and 
has not evaluated opportunities for consolidation, resulting in unnecessary costs. 
The GAO ultimately attributed the need for the many ad hoc processes that currently 
exist to a failure of the DoD to predict change in the external environment, saying 
that “the department had not anticipated the accelerated pace of change in enemy 
tactics and techniques that ultimately heightened the need for a rapid response to 
new threats in Afghanistan and Iraq” (GAO, 2011, p. 9). 
The conclusions and tone of these reports appear critical of the so-called ad 
hoc solutions. For example, the Gansler report noted, “While these programs have 
produced significant successes, their ad-hoc, one of a kind nature has created a 
different set of problems. They rely on learning on the job with little emphasis on 
support training and sustainment” (Gansler, 2009, p. 6). Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
given the bureaucratic nature and culture of the DoD, the reports called for 
centralization, formalization, and codification to correct the problem presented to the 
DoD organization by the ad hoc organizations and processes. Indeed, we have 
previously suggested that DoD has a propensity or preference toward such 
centralization and to its own detriment (Dillard, 2005). Given the current nature and 
culture of the DoD, the survival of rapid or urgent fielding capabilities may indeed 
depend on some form of the solutions recommended in these reports. However, we 
argue it is important to note that in framing ad hoc responses as a problem and then 
offering a solution, these reports fail to address the institutional and cultural 
environment, which they argue cannot sustain innovation. Of perhaps greater 
concern, it is possible that enacting the recommendations of the reports without full 
consideration of the value of the ad hoc problem solving that occurred and the costs 
associated with building a dynamic capability, the DoD may eventually lose a 
valuable source of business process and organizational innovation and adaptation 
and may overinvest in a costly organizational solution, when a less costly alternative 
might suffice.  
Research Context: Framing Rapid Fielding  
We situate this study in a reframing of the widely cited Gansler report of 2009. 
Our reframing is conducted in the spirit of the accepted wisdom that creative 
solutions often require thinking out of the box or lateral thinking (De Bono, 1967), 
which we equate more formally to adopting an entrepreneurial mindset—described 
below—and guided by a research approach based on frame analysis. We undertake 
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this exploration not to argue against specific recommendations of the Gansler report, 
but rather because we believe that a problem of such persistence and consequence 
deserves considered reflection from multiple perspectives. 
Research Framework 
An entrepreneurial mindset is the ability to think differently, to sense, act, and 
mobilize under uncertain conditions (Haynie et al., 2010). Adaptive thinking hinges 
on “the ability to be dynamic, flexible, and self-regulating in one’s cognitions” (p. 
218), and is of fundamental importance to entrepreneurs or others facing uncertain 
task environments. Adaptive thinking is dependent on metacognitive processes—
thinking about thinking—which enable individuals to think beyond existing heuristics 
and knowledge structures in order to be adaptable. A metacognitive strategy refers 
to the mental framework formulated by an individual, through which to evaluate 
multiple alternative responses to processing a task. Researchers have demonstrated 
that employing a metacognitive strategy can improve the outcome of problem 
solving by helping individuals to avoid using a flawed approach for addressing a 
problem (Haynie et al., 2010; Staw & Boettger, 1990).  
Drawing on these arguments, Haynie et al. (2010) argued that successful 
entrepreneurs will be those that formulate a metacognitive strategy to generate 
alternative approaches to thinking about how to accomplish tasks in ambiguous 
environments. In other words, entrepreneurs who succeed will be those who can 
develop multiple alternative ways of thinking about a problem. We approached this 
research in this spirit, seeking an alternative strategy for thinking about the problem 
of acquisition reform in order to evaluate possible responses. 
A metacognitive strategy requires metacognitive awareness, that is, 
awareness concerning one’s own thinking. We thus undertook an examination of the 
logic, assumptions, and links between these and the conclusions presented in the 
Gansler report. Our examination followed the norms and precepts of frame analysis 
as developed in organization research (Benford & Snow, 2000; Creed, Langstraat, & 
Scully, 2002).  
Frames are sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate activities 
(Benford & Snow, 2000). Frames are created through conversations and written 
communication, which connect events and experiences (Benford & Snow, 2000). 
Core framing tasks include diagnostic framing, the identification of problems and 
causes; and prognostic framing, the articulation of a proposed solution. Institutional 
solutions to problems result when recurring or widespread problems are theorized, 
or described in general terms, and agreed upon, pointing to a particular solution 
(Suchman, 1995). Following Creed, Langstraat, and Scully (2002), we developed a 
signature matrix to sort the idea elements found in the Gansler report into categories 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó - 8 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
that support the functions of interpretation, argumentation, punctuation, elaboration 
and motivation. This allowed us to discern key elements of the frame and consider 
alternatives. 
The Framing of the Gansler Report 
The Gansler report depicted the response to the unanticipated needs of 
warfighters in Afghanistan and Iraq as evidence that the the DoD cannot respond to 
changing needs. The report framed the emergence of many organizations and the 
lack of systematic, codified processes as evidence of failure and problems, which 
must be corrected. In particular, the report highlighted the lack of sustainable funding 
for ad hoc processes as a problem for which the solution is codification, 
centralization, and formalization. Although this is a logical solution to the problem as 
framed in the report, an alternate frame might suggest other possible solutions.  
In the Gansler report, the large number of requests to meet urgent needs, and 
the highly visible problem of IEDs were used to support the assertion that the DoD 
does not have ability to rapidly field new capabilities. The text of the report includes 
the phrase, “in a systematic and effective way,” linking the assertion of failure and a 
lack of systematic processes to ineffectiveness. This depiction is further linked to an 
overall presentation of the problem or the diagnostic frame. The lack of systematic 
processes makes the current solution unsustainable, and since the problem is the 
lack of systematic processes, the solution is therefore the creation of a systematic, 
codified process in a formal, centralized organization. The latest update of the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (CJCSI 3170.01H; Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012) already reflects some implementation of this 
recommendation. 
While recognizing some successful outcomes resulting from ad hoc 
organizations and business processes, recognition of achievements was followed by 
critiques of the processes that achieved them. Variation was presented as redundant 
and costly. Ad hoc problem solving is not systematic or codified (and linked to 
ineffective and unsustainable). Workarounds, while recognized as necessary, are 
depicted as disjointed (linked to unsystematic and ineffective). For example, 
Over the past five years there have been many success stories and 
lessons Learned. … However, in the larger picture, the DOD has not 
made major, institutional changes in budgeting and acquisition 
essential to posture itself for the ongoing hybrid warfare reality. DOD is 
not systematically prepared to anticipate and respond to urgent and 
dynamically changing needs that will be a permanent part of 21st 
century operations (Gansler, 2009, p. viii),  
When progress is noted, it (progress) refers to codification, as in the following 
example:  
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The Joint Staff, COCOMs, and the Services have all codified in 
directives new processes to identify urgent needs and provide rapid 
responses. Recent progress includes a detailed urgent needs process 
memorandum circulated by the Secretary of the Navy in March 2009 
(Gansler, 2009, p. 3).  
The arguments of the report support the recommendation to restructure the 
organization and to create a codified, systematic process for rapid fielding. This 
recommendation is consistent with the bureaucratic nature and culture of the DoD 
and with past routines for codifying, reorganizing, and centralizing. However, a 
reframing of the problem allows a deeper consideration of factors mentioned but not 
emphasized in the report and illuminates heretofore underemphasized or overlooked 
implications of the report’s recommendations. 
An Alternate Perspective 
We explored the question, “What is the most cost-effective means of 
achieving the dynamic and adaptive business capabilities the DoD seems to 
require?” We began by reframing the Gansler report. A summary of our analysis and 
reframing is shown in Table 1. In our reframing, we considered the establishment of 
20 (and eventually more than 30) organizational entities over a period of a few years 
and their development of associated business models and processes to be an 
amazing adaptive response to an external shock by a bureaucratic organization, 
which would be expected to be hampered by severe inertia. 
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Table 1. Framing of the Gansler Report 
Focal event Warfighters in Afghanistan and Iraq have unanticipated equipment needs  
 Gansler Frame Representative Quote Alternate Frame 
Depiction DoD has not/cannot 
respond. 
DoD lacks the ability to rapidly field 
new capabilities to the warfighter (in a 
systematic and effective way) (p. 1). 
Acquisition community responded.  
Punctuation: What 
is the problem? 
Current rapid fielding 
process is 
unsustainable. 
The essence of the problem is the 
need to field militarily useful solutions 
faster (p. viii). 
Current approaches to implement 
rapid responses to urgent needs are 
not sustainable (p. 10). 
Adapting (business organization) to 
changing environment  
Current process is an example of a 




Variation is redundant 
and costly. 
The procedures these organizations 
have developed … vary across the 
DoD. … Definitions and regulations 
that apply to the processes vary [and 
words] … are sometimes used in 
conflicting and overlapping ways (p. 
22). 
Variation is a necessary component 
of change. 
Ad hoc problem solving 
is problematic.  
Their ad hoc, one-of-a-kind nature has 
created a different set of problems. 
They rely on learning on-the-job with 
little emphasis on support, training, 
and sustainment (p. 19). 
Ad hoc problem solving is a “low 




All also utilize workarounds … to 
sidestep traditional acquisition and 
fielding process, but these are 
generally disjointed (p. 40). 




consolidation result in 
sustainability. 
DoD needs to codify and 
institutionalize “rapid” acquisition 
processes and practices (p. 37). 
Codification is costly. The full value 
lies in the knowledge gained through 
the process, gaining full value 
requires collaboration 
Motivation: What 






The Secretary of Defense should 
establish a new agency (p. 46). 
Evaluate costs/benefits of ad hoc 
solutions and seek solutions that 
retain diverse skill sets. 
Our perspective is not without precedent, even within the DoD. In a 2011 
report, Lessons Learned from Rapid Acquisition: Better, Faster, Cheaper? Colonel 
Robert A. Rasche examined the impacts of wartime acquisition initiatives on the 
DoD acquisition systems. Rasche framed the continual reform of DoD acquisition as 
a possible indicator of positive adaptive change. Perhaps best known is the large 
scale and rapid acquisition of at least 7,000 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
(MRAP) vehicles in just over two years. The need for MRAP vehicles was initially 
articulated, in February of 2005, by Marines who needed protection from IEDs, 
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RPGs, and small arms fire. The need was met through a variety of ad hoc solutions 
involving innovative adaptations to standard processes for establishing 
requirements, evaluating progress and contracting. This instance is cited as an 
exemplary outcome in a GAO report (GAO, 2011). 
Viewing this response above as a successful solution, suggests a 
reconsideration of the definition of the problem. The Gansler report is clearly focused 
on the immediate need for rapid fielding, as tasked, and our reframing should not be 
viewed as a criticism of those efforts. However, when given the luxury of reflective 
consideration afforded a research project (as opposed to the task-specific demands 
facing a decisively engaged military force), the context of the organization, past 
attempts at reform, and an environment characterized by unpredictable events 
suggest a broader and persistent need for business adaptability. We reframe the 
problem in terms of this broader need: The Department of Defense must adapt its 
business model and processes to meet unpredictable demands from the external 
environment. This need is recognized in the Gansler report (underline added):  
The global landscape has changed the national security environment, 
demanding the ability to rapidly access and field capabilities from any 
source. Agile adversaries are taking advantage of important, globally 
available technologies by rapidly creating and fielding highly effective 
weapons. Moreover, the nation faces a vast range of potential 
contingencies around the world. … This set of circumstances calls for 
rapid adaptation on the part of the United States as well—adaptation of 
tactics, techniques, and procedures as well as the ability to field new 
[warfighting] capabilities on a timeframe unfamiliar to the bureaucratic 
processes that dominate acquisition in the Department of Defense 
today. (Ganlser, 2009, p. 3) 
However, the overriding focal problem highlighted by the framing of the 
Gansler report is the need for a rapid fielding capability. Reframing the problem as 
we have done, suggests a reconsideration of the role and value of variation, ad hoc 
problem solving, and codification. The Gansler report framed these factors as 
contributors to the problem. In our reframing, we considered the role of variation as 
precursor to change, workarounds as a mechanism for allowing creativity within a 
bureaucracy, and the benefits of codification as deriving from the process of 
articulation and clarification as much as (or even more than) from written output. Our 
reframing suggests a need to evaluate the costs and benefits of ad hoc problem 
solving versus codified business capabilities and to seek overall solutions that most 
efficiently support the business adaptability in an unpredictable environment. 
Research Approach and Methods 
The purpose of this study was to explore what influences the successful 
transition of COTS technologies to the warfighter. During our initial investigation, we 
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noted shifts in organization structure, goals, and business processes of the JCTD 
office in response to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In accordance with a 
grounded research approach, (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Howard-Grenville et al., 
2011; Lofland et al., 2006) we adapted our analysis plan to focus on how the 
organization was adapting to change. This report is based on our collection and 
analysis of archival and interview data. The organization is once again adapting as 
the need for rapid fielding in Afghanistan and Iraqi diminish and our analysis to this 
point must thus be considered preliminary.  
We began this study with a review of literature related to the JCTD office and 
the evolution of defense acquisition processes. We also conducted a round of 
exploratory interviews with subject matter experts in the JCTD office. These were 
informal, unstructured interviews, designed to familiarize us with the history, 
operations, and evolution of the office. We encouraged experts to elaborate on these 
topics and took detailed notes. From these interviews and documents and 
summaries provided by the JCTD office, we developed summaries of several JCTD 
projects. A list of the projects we disscussed is included in Appendix A: JCTD 
Projects. In the course of the initial data collection, we noted an apparent and 
deliberate shift had occurred in the focus of the JCTD office in recent years: longer 
term higher risk projects to a narrower focus on rapidly delivering capability to the 
warfighter to meet urgent needs resulting from the Iraq and Afghanistan. We 
conducted five additional structured interviews to explore the role of ad hoc problem 
solving. These interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
We collected additional data from two sources, a snowballing Google search 
and the Internet Archive (Aten, 2010; Nardon & Aten, 2008). On Google, we 
searched for all pages and documents with JCTD or ACTD and the word technology 
in the title from the year 2000 to the present and saved each as a PDF. We then 
followed links to identify additional pages and documents, yielding an initial 247 
saved PDFs. We scanned all of the documents and excluded documents such as 
glossary pages, descriptions of acronyms, and descriptions and press releases 
related to particular JCTDs. This yielded a dataset which included presentation 
slides, JCTD announcements and policies, and descriptions of the organization.  
Next, we collected data from the Internet Archive, “a non-profit organization 
that was founded to build an Internet library, with the purpose of offering permanent 
access for researchers, historians, and scholars to historical collections that exist in 
digital format” (Internet Archive, March 30, 2009). The Internet Archive is searchable 
by URL with a search resulting in a list of hyperlinks to web pages for the specified 
URL, by date, that are included in the archive. Thus, one can view web pages of an 
organization as they existed for a particular year in the past. The archive for the 
ACTD and JCTD was intact, with multiple instances captured every year from 2001 
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to the present. We reviewed one web page per year, adding instances as necessary 
when we noted major changes to ensure that we did not miss relevant documents. 
On each page, we followed links and printed PDF files of web pages and documents 
related to the evolution of the JCTD office. We selected pages and documents 
available from links titled Introduction, Guidelines, Q & A, Links, Organization, and 
What’s New. Our saved documents included conference presentation slides, 
management briefings, procedures and guidelines, organization charts, and the text 
of speeches. We did not save specific JCTD project descriptions, glossary pages, or 
point of contact information pages. These searches yielded a total of 59 documents 
for coding as shown in Appendix B, Table 1: Overall Summary of Analysis. 
We organized all of the documents by year and imported them into an Nvivo 
qualitative data analysis software project. We used Nvivo to code the data into broad 
categories suggested by our previous analysis: organization structure, business 
model (mission/goals, value proposition, measures), technology characteristics 
(maturity level, use, customer), and process characteristics (requirements, steps). 
We then generated reports allowing us to view examples from the broad categories 
across time. These reports are included in Appendix B. 
Research Setting: The JCTD Office 
The Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration (JCTD) program began in 
1995 as the Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Program, with 
the aim of more rapid prototyping and fielding of technology for the Department of 
Defense (DOD) by demonstrating and assessing the military utility of emerging 
technologies. Over the 18 years since its inception, the overall mission of the 
program has remained unchanged.  
History and Purpose 
In the late 1980s, the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense, also 
known as the Packard Commission, was charged by Predsident Reagan in 
Executive Order 12,526 to conduct a defense management study focusing on the 
budget process, the procurement of systems, the legislative oversight, and 
intragovernment organizational arrangements in regard to defense (Packard, 1986). 
Among other things, the report indicated a high need for prototyping. The Packard 
Commison report stated that  
a high priority should be given to building and testing prototype systems and 
subsystems before proceeding with full-scale development. This early phase 
of R&D should employ extensive informal competition and use streamlined 
procurement processes. It should demonstrate that the new technology under 
test can substantially improve military capability, and should as well provide a 
basis for making realistic cost estimates prior to a full scale development 
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decision. This increased emphasis on prototyping should allow us to ‘fly and 
know how much it will cost before we buy’ (1986, p. xxv).  
The Packard Commission report, and other Defense Science Board reports, 
led to the establishment of the ACTD Program.  From the beginning, ACTDs were 
user-oriented and designed to demonstrate military utility in line with the Packard 
Commission report that suggested the DoD adopt a try before you buy strategy for 
emerging technologies. In addition, there was a heavy focus on joint operations and 
combatant commands (COCOM) involvement. These characteristics remain today. 
The COCOMs remain a primary customer of the JCTD and identify capability gaps 
not being adequately addressed by the Services but viewed as mission-critical by 
the COCOMs.  
In response to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the ACTD Program became 
the JCTD Program in 2006 and implemented a new business process to better focus 
on the Combatant Commanders’ most critical warfighter needs and to accelerated 
the identification and execution of JCTD projects to meet emerging asymmetrical 
threats.   JCTDs also emphasize increased upfront transition planning and early 
technology spirals.  The increased focus on the rapid delivery of capabilities to the 
warfighter saw transition rates increased from 60% to 70% to over 80%. 
Final approval of JCTDs is given by the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics who sends the proposed JCTD projects to 
Congress.  By law the Department has to wait 45 days once Congress is notified 
before it can initiate a JCTD.  In September 2009, the DOD established the Office of 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Rapid Fielding (ODASD [RF]) who is 
the overseeing agency of the JCTD program.  
Technology 
An important part of considering candidates to become JCTD is the 
technology readiness level (TRL). Technology maturity is a principal element of 
program risk and refers to the degree to which proposed critical technologies meet 
program objectives. The DoD Component Science and Technology (S&T) Executive 
directs the technology readiness levels and determines the level of maturity of a 
given system.  
There are nine TRL levels, each representing a major step forward in the 
development process of the system. JCTDs are primarily focused on technologies 
with a TRL of 5, 6 or 7. The TRL of ACTDs fluctuated depending on the type of 
system and the level of risk that managers and oversight organizations were willing 
to take. In the period before 2003, projects tended to be much larger and assumed 
more risk in terms of the readiness of the technologies, as in the cases of the Global 
Hawk and Predator JCTDs). During the early years of the Program the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was a significant contributor to the 
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funding of ACTDs; however, eventually DARPA’s involvement in the program 
waned, and so too did the large and risky nature of many ACTDs. The wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan and the initiation of JCTDs, to replace ACTDs in 2006, accelerated 
this trend. 
The transition to the JCTD Program and the increased focus on meeting 
urgent operational needs of the DoDs warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in 
a program that was risk adverse and focused on smaller projects that could quickly 
deliver capability to the warfighter. Figure 1 shows the relatively steady decline in the 
average estimated costs of the ACTD/JCTD projects by year for the last 10 years. 
The decline in costs coupled with the decline in the average length is evidence 
which supports the notion that the program was, as one official interviewed by the 
authors put it, focused on “getting something out the door as quickly as possible.” 
 
Figure 1.  Average Estimated Costs of JCTD Projects 
More recently (in the last few years) the JCTD has encountered criticism for 
its increasing aversion to risk. Also, the need for rapid fielding has been lessened by 
the ending of the Iraq war and the winding-down of operations in Afghanistan. Now, 
there is an emerging desire to shift the JCTD Program back to once again focus on 
the larger projects addressing the strategic priorities of the DoD. This will lead to 
larger more risky projects that have a bigger potential payoff.  The JCTD Program is 
adapting once more.  
Dynamic Capabilities and Ad Hoc Problem Solving: 
Pathways to Adaptability 
Although the political environment is not perfectly analogous to the business 
environment, some useful comparisons can be made. The shocks of 9/11 and 
enemy innovations suggest the acquisition community is, and will continue to, face a 
turbulent environment. Studies of organizations operating in turbulent environments 
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Scholars have argued that dynamic capabilities, or the ability to systematically 
change existing organizational routines, are a key to success (Teece, 2007). 
However, Winter (2003) argued that the costs of creating dynamic capabilities may 
not be justifiable in turbulent environments. Winter’s (2003) argument, along with a 
recent discussion of anticipated consequences in such environments (Selsky, Goes, 
& Babüroğlu, 2007), suggested that ad hoc problem solving may be an effective 
solution for adapting to change. We discuss these ideas below.  
Understanding organizational adaption and change is a key focus of 
organization scholars. Organizational routines provide one avenue for exploring how 
organizations change their capabilities. Organizational routines are the basic 
components of organizational behavior and are a crucial to understanding how 
organizational capabilities are accumulated, transferred, and applied (Becker, 
Lazaric, Nelson, & Winter, 2005). Thus, organizational routines provide a useful 
starting point for an exploration of the pathways to organizational adaptability. The 
discussion below draws largely from Winter’s (2003) Understanding Dynamic 
Capabilities.  
An organizational routine is highly patterned, repetitious behavior that is 
learned, founded at least in part in tacit knowledge and directed toward specific 
objectives. Thus, behaviors to run a particular production line to produce a particular 
product constitute a routine. Organizational improvisation is not a routine because it 
is dynamic, one-of-kind, and conscious rather than patterned, repetitious and tacit 
behavior. An organizational capability is a high-level routine that confers upon an 
organization’s management a set of decision options for producing a particular type 
of output.  
Recent research on strategy in rapidly changing environments has focused 
on dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen,1997). 
Despite the name, dynamic organizational capabilities are based on routines and 
patterned, repetitious behavior. The dynamic refers to the focus of the routine. 
Ordinary organizational capabilities are operational capabilities. Those 
organizational capabilities that provide value exhibit technical and environmental fit, 
allowing an organization to make a living by performing a particular function well and 
also allowing an organization to succeed within a particular environment, 
respectively. Dynamic capabilities are organizational capabilities that extend, modify, 
or create ordinary capabilities, helping organizations shape and adapt to the 
environment, achieving evolutionary fitness. Dynamic capabilities involve sensing 
and shaping opportunities and threats, seizing opportunities and maintaining 
competitiveness by combining, enhancing, protecting and reconfiguring tangible and 
intangible assets. Zollo and Winter (2002) defined a dynamic capability as “a learned 
and stable pattern of collective activity through which the organization systematically 
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generates and modifies its operating routines in pursuit of improved effectiveness” 
(p. 340). Examples of dynamic capabilities include systematic methods for changing 
operating routines and organizational capabilities for process research development, 
restructuring and re-engineering, and post-firm acquisition integration.  
According to Zollo and Winter (2002), dynamic capabilities are created 
through three learning mechanisms: experience accumulation, knowledge 
articulation, and knowledge codification, as shown in Figure 2. Knowledge 
articulation occurs when individuals express their opinions and beliefs, challenge 
each other’s viewpoints, and engage in constructive confrontations. Knowledge 
articulation is a deliberate process through which groups and individuals seek to 
understand what does and does not work to complete a particular organizational 
task. Organizational and individual competence is enhanced when implicit 
knowledge is articulated through discussion, debriefing sessions, and assessments 
of past performance. These processes serve to improve individuals’ understanding 
of the causal mechanisms that link actions to outcomes. Articulation requires 
significant effort but can produce improved understanding of changes in links 
between action and performance. Articulation can thus result in adaption of existing 
routines.  
 
Figure 2. Learning Dynamic Capabilities and Operating Routines 
(Zollo & Winter, 2002) 
Knowledge codification occurs when articulated understandings are captured 
in writing as in, for example, manuals, decision support systems, or project 
management software. Knowledge codification requires greater effort than 
articulation. Codification is challenging because it can be difficult to assure that 
codified guidance is adequate and also that such guidance is implemented and 
followed. The additional effort means that codification may be costly. Costs include 
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the time, resources, and attention invested in the development of task-specific tools, 
as well as the indirect costs of a possible increase in organizational inertia (because 
the now codified routine is applied regularly, making change more difficult) or the 
inappropriate application of a codified routine.  
The development of dynamic capabilities is costly. Investments include 
financial, temporal, and cognitive resources that are directed towards improving 
understanding of action–performance linkages. The level of investment can be 
considered along a continuum. It will be lowest when a firm relies on the 
accumulation of experience in a semiautomatic fashion and more costly when the 
firm relies on knowledge articulation and even more so for codification. Dynamic 
capabilities require specialized personnel committed to change roles and, to be 
economically worthwhile, an opportunity to be exercised. 
According to some scholars, organizations operating in rapidly changing 
business environments require dynamic organizational capabilities, which can be 
“harnessed to continuously create, extend, upgrade, protect and keep relevant the 
enterprise’s unique asset base” (Teece, 2007, p. 1319). However, although dynamic 
capabilities have attracted attention, they are not the only means of organizational 
adaptation and change. Firms can also adapt and change through “ad hoc” or one-
time problem solving. Ad hoc problem solving is not repetitious and highly patterned. 
It typically occurs in response to unpredictable events in the environment. Whereas 
the development and maintenance of dynamic capabilities requires ongoing 
specialized investments in personnel and attention, the costs of ad hoc problem 
solving disappear when there is no problem to solve. The costs of ad hoc problem 
solving are largely opportunity costs associated with the attention given the problem. 
If the problem is no longer presented, attention shifts and costs are relieved. Thus, 
so-called routine capabilities, augmented when needed with ad hoc problem solving, 
may be the more cost-effective response to achieving organization adaptation 
(Winter, 2003). 
The responses of the acquisition community to the change in warfighters’ 
needs, exemplified in this study through the case of the JCTD office, can be 
considered a successful example of ad hoc problem solving. The community reacted 
by drawing on existing organizations, budgets, and processes to create new 
organizations and processes to fill a particular need, learned on the job, and forged 
one-time solutions. These actions are examples of ad hoc problem solving, bringing 
creative innovation to a particular problem.  
As discussed above, such problem solving may be more cost effective than 
creating a dynamic capability. This is particularly true when an environment is 
ambiguous and unpredictable or competitors are likely to copy one’s success. The 
long-term response to the need for rapid fielding during the conflicts in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan should take into account the success of this problem solving approach. 
An evolutionary approach to organizational change would suggest that the variation 
of organizations and processes be subject to environmental selection, whereby only 
those exhibiting fit with the environment are likely to survive. Thus, if in fact rapid 
fielding remains a paramount need, we would expect the creativity that fostered the 
organizations that met that need to find a way to continue to meet it. History 
suggests that those within the DoD are adept at doing this. Alternatively, however, if 
rapid fielding is not required, the costs of developing this dynamic capability may be 
misplaced. 
DoD acquisition has exhibited a long history of resistance to change. Given 
the bureaucratic make-up of the DoD and the size of the organization, this is not 
surprising. Further, bureaucratic processes are appropriate in some situations 
(particularly those involving great risk) and may be a necessity for the DoD. 
However, as many have noted, DoD organization structure and processes were well 
adapted to the post-WWII Cold War era, and since 2001, that stable environment no 
longer exists. Thus, many DoD routine capabilities may have technical fit—they fit 
well with a particular function, such as the acquisition of large, complicated weapons 
systems to meet the needs of many players when time and money are abundant—
but may not fit with the new environment. The question then becomes, what is the 
best way to adapt to the new environment.  
One must be somewhat cautious in making direct comparisons between the 
competitive business environment—where success is generally defined as earning 
greater financial returns than one’s rival—and the multifaceted environment facing 
the DoD acquisition community. The discussion above suggests that ad hoc problem 
solving should not be discounted out of hand and without consideration. Such 
solutions allow the DoD to adapt in low cost manner, without attempting to change 
the overall bureaucracy. Although developing dynamic organizational capabilities 
may be possible, doing so is clearly costly and difficult, as exemplified by the many 
failed attempts with the DoD and in industry. An alternate perspective on ad hoc 
problem solving suggests that these solutions should be rewarded, and perhaps 
structural changes should be designed to allow such solutions to emerge and 
dissipate as needed, rather than automatically seeking codification, centralization, 
and formalization. This is particularly salient if one considers that the environment 
may continue to change. The organizations and processes which have emerged and 
evolved to exhibit technical and environmental fit for the environment following the 
September 2001 attacks, may not fit the environment of the future. Ad hoc problem 
solving is a low cost alternative for allowing adaptability within the large bureaucracy. 
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Implementing Change—An Additional Consideration 
As noted above, this research suggests that reforms should consider how to 
take advantage of the ad hoc problem solving skills of the DoD acquisition 
community. Furthermore, the discussion suggests that when codification of learning 
is undertaken, much of the value of such efforts lies in the process, rather than in the 
end. Capturing this value requires a collaborative, safe environment that facilitates 
knowledge sharing. The acquisition community can be viewed as a system, 
composed of many different types of actors and organizations, operating in an 
uncertain environment subject to shocks and subsequent turbulence. Although some 
competition within systems is beneficial, a long history of research documents the 
deleterious effects of competitive environments on knowledge sharing at the 
individual level, and of price wars and hyper-competition on industry profitability at 
the systems level. Policy-makers should be aware of the potential consequences of 
such negative competition and structure reforms to minimize its likelihood. 
Scholars argue that in business landscapes characterized by great 
turbulence, traditional competitive actions may not lead to advantage but may rather 
result in further turbulence. For example, organizations relying on dynamic 
capabilities to turn themselves into moving targets by moving faster and  changing 
more quickly to avoid being leapfrogged by competitors, may increase field level 
turbulence (Selksky et al. 2007). Selksy et al. (2007) argued that success in 
turbulent environments hinges on collaborative endeavors to develop new field-level 
processes, adaptive skills, and capabilities. Selsky et al. (2007) illustrated these 
dynamics referencing a pair of studies of hospitals in hyper-turbulent environments. 
In response to changes in federal Medicare reimbursement programs, the states of 
California and Minnesota each made major reforms to their healthcare systems, 
resulting in a turbulent business environment. However, the healthcare industries in 
the two states experienced different outcomes.  
In 1982, California adopted a managed competition program in healthcare, 
creating incentives for providers to compete on price for government care for 
indigent citizens. At the same time, the federal government changed Medicare 
reimbursement procedures. Together, these events resulted in unanticipated 
turbulence in the business landscape of the state’s hospitals.  
California’s hospitals reacted immediately. Over one six-week period during 
the study, two hospitals merged, one was acquired, and seven out of 30 hospitals 
experienced CEO succession. The hospitals entered mergers, alliances, and 
partnerships between hospitals, physicians, and insurance plans. These actions 
challenged traditional rules of competition within the industry, understandings about 
the domain and identity of hospitals, and the traditional boundaries between players 
in the healthcare field. For example, insurers became deliverers of care through 
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investments in managed care organizations, hospitals became providers of care 
through offsite clinics, invading the traditional domain of doctors, and physicians took 
on new risks for the cost and quality of the services they offered by signing preferred 
or exclusive provider contracts.  
In response, the hospitals formed integrated networks seeking access to new 
markets, economies of scope and scale, and complements to their distinctive 
competencies. However, as the environmental turbulence continued to increase, the 
hospitals reacted with hyper-competitive moves actively disrupting previous 
competitive norms and each other’s competitive advantages. For example, preferred 
provider networks linked groups of physicians to particular provider hospitals and 
health plans. This restricted other hospitals’ access to these physicians, spawning a 
bidding war. Medical staffs that had taken hospitals years to develop were 
decimated. Over time, the competitive actions ceased to provide advantage and 
success and became only a requirement for survival. Smaller players were 
marginalized as larger, stronger organizations consolidated their control over 
resources. As noted in a report by Cris Rauber for the San Franciso Business Times 
in 2005, the region’s healthcare system continues to suffer from “huge systemic 
flaws: Rampant inflation, large numbers of uninsured, uneven and hard to measure 
quality and uncertain funding” (Selsky, 2007). 
In response to the federal changes, Minnesota reconfigured its healthcare 
industry a decade later. Healthcare providers responded initially in a manner similar 
to those in California. However, in contrast to California’s hospital executives, those 
in Minnesota viewed themselves as the architects of a new organizational model. 
Minnesota’s executives constructed collaborative networks yielding “win” solutions 
for many players in the field. While vigorous competition continued, executives were 
able to anticipate some of the negative effects of their individual competitive actions 
in the extended field and to create a model of competition that partially controlled for 
those effects.  
In the end, the process of industry restructuring in California generated 
negative externalities, whereas industry transformation in Minnesota retained 
negative feedback brakes and avoided some of these effects. As illustrated by these 
examples, hyper-competition in a turbulent environment can result in unanticipated, 
negative effects. In California, failures to develop sustainable, collective strategies 
“echo in the form of failed alliances, labour problems and uncertain financial health” 
(Selsky, Goes, and Baburoglu, 2007, p. 85), whereas the collaborative efforts of 
hospitals in Minnesota contributed to a more successful, field-level change. 
If successful adaptation in a turbulent environment is best achieved through 
collaborative effort, it is imperative that such collaboration between field players be 
fostered. Although comparisons between a competitive business environment and a 
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public agency are not absolute, they can be enlightening. In the field of defense 
acquisition, there are many players. As in the hospital examples above, an 
environmental change resulted in a redefinition of the domain and roles, the 
emergence of new entities and partnerships, and the creation of new processes. If 
changes to the system lead to hyper-competitive behavior among the new players in 
the acquisition field now facing restructuring or between the new and traditional 
players, unanticipated negative outcomes can be expected.  
This suggests that if substantial reorganization and or codification of 
emergent processes is undertaken, the DoD should consider how to foster 
collaboration between the newly formed organizations to develop roles and patterns 
of interaction viewed as “wins” for multiple players in the field. Structural reform 
should be complemented by efforts to solicit and incorporate inputs from new and 
traditional field players with a view toward crafting a field solution. Achieving “the 
hope that, over time, the DoD acquisition community will understand the benefits of 
the rapid approach—and the countercultural stigma will dissolve” (Gansler, 2009, p. 
26) may require active intervention to change perceptions, and at the very least, a 
thoughtful consideration of how to avoid worsening the problem when making 
structural changes. 
Conclusion 
This report describes the preliminary analysis and findings of our study 
exploring what drives successful organizational adaptation in the context of 
technology transition and acquisition within the DoD. It is based on our initial 
collection and analysis of archival and interview data. Our preliminary analysis 
suggests that ad hoc problem solving may be an undervalued yet broadly practiced 
skill set within the DoD. What we found most noteworthy in our interviews and 
observations was that entrepreneurial-type organizational shifts can indeed occur 
within a large mechanistic bureaucracy like the DoD. It makes us ponder whether 
the vastness of the organization—its mere size—actually lends to pockets of 
organizational departure from what is codified in regulations, instructions, and so on. 
Moreover, we feel our strongest conclusion was perhaps not apparent to many 
others while it was occurring—that the JCTD Office moved away from investments 
based upon highest capability payoff towards those based upon nearer-term delivery 
and user needs, using technology maturity and urgency as determining metrics. That 
the office could maneuver into this space was not from directives, but independently 
and from real-world warfare scenarios in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation 
Enduring Freedom. The shift was from asking, “What is in the realm of future 
possible technological applications?” to ”How can emerging technologies rapidly be 
fielded to satisfy current needs?” The DoD formally established the Office of the 
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Assistant Secretary of Defense for Rapid Fielding (ODASD[RF]) in 2009—fully six to 
eight years beyond these combat operations.  
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Appendix A: Text Analysis and Summary 
This appendix contains reports summarizing the coding and analysis of the 
database of documents containing the term ACTD or JCTD. Both terms were 
searched on Google and also using the Internet Archive in order to include 
documents available on a given year, that have since been removed. This appendix 
contains the table and reports listed with a brief description below. 
Table 2: Overall Summary of Analysis—Documents and Codes by Year 
This report shows the total number of documents retrieved (59), by year, and 
the number of times segments of text referring to each of four categories (business 
model, organization structure, process characteristics, technology characteristics) 
were identified. This report also shows the number of documents, by year, in which 
text referring to each of the four categories was identified, and the total number of 
segments of text coded (1,307). 
Report 1: Project Summary 
This report shows the title and source of each document (ACTD Google 
search, JCTD Google search, Internet Archive [WayBack]). 
Report 2: Source Summary 
This report shows the total number of words, paragraphs, and segments 
coded in each document. 
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Report 1: Project Summary 
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Appendix B: JCTD Projects Reviewed  
 Large Data (LD) 
This project demonstrated a highly scalable, rapid and secure integrated 
capability to effectively retrieve, store and share massive amounts of 
information effectively between users. 
 Persistent Ground Surveillance Systems (PGSS) 
This project demonstrated a small aerostat system used to provide 
persistent surveillance. 
 Rapid Reaction Tunnel Detection (R2TD) 
This project demonstrated a family of systems to detect and characterize 
tunnels. 
 Collaborative Online Reconnaissance Provide Operationally Responsive 
Attack Link (CORPORAL) 
This project demonstrated data sharing across airborne and ground-based 
systems for collaboration and visibility to higher authorities.  
 Commercial Radar Operation Support to SOUTHCOM (CROSS)  
Demonstrated the ability to task commercial radar constellations and 
receive unclassified imagery data to support operations and contingency 
planning activities. 
 Joint Multi-Mission Electro-Optical System (JMMES) 
This project demonstrated an automated wide-area surveillance capability 
using advanced sensors in a common turret compatible with a variety of 
aircraft.  
 Counter-Intelligence/Human Intelligence Advanced Modernization Program 
This project demonstrated Intelligence Operations Now (CHAMPION) - 
Optimized the reporting of timely and actionable Counter-Intelligence (CI) 
and Human Intelligence data. 
 Critical Runway Assessment and Repair (CRATR) 
This project demonstrated the ability to conduct rapid runway damage 
assessment and repair.  
 Joint Medical Distance Support and Evaluation (JMDSE) 
This project demonstrated battlefield casualty care support with precision 
medical resupply and telemedicine for battlefield reach back. 
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